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THE US STATEMENT AT THE FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE: 
COMPOUNDING THE ERROR IN REJECTING THE COMPOSITE PROTOCOL 
 
by Graham S. Pearson*, Malcolm R. Dando§ & Nicholas A. Sims†  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  The twenty-fourth session of the Ad Hoc Group session in July - August 2001 opened with 
plenary statements on Monday and Tuesday 23 and 24 July 2001 on behalf of over 50 of the 
approximately 55 States engaged in the negotiation of the Protocol that the Chairman's 
composite Protocol text should form the basis for the political decisions to adopt the Protocol 
before the Fifth Review Conference later in 2001.  On the morning of Wednesday 25 July, a 
further two States Parties spoke in support of the Protocol. 
 
2.  The United States then spoke saying that "After extensive deliberation, the United States 
has concluded that the current approach to a Protocol to the Biological Weapons 
Convention,...is not, in our view, capable of achieving the mandate set forth for the Ad Hoc 
Group, strengthening confidence in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention."  
They went on to say that "We believe the objective of the mandate was and is important to 
international security, we will therefore be unable to support the current text, even with 
changes, as an appropriate outcome of the Ad Hoc Group efforts." 
 
3.  A detailed evaluation1 of the United States statement analysed its various elements and 
concluded that the rejection by the United States of the Protocol was a huge mistake based on 
illogical assessments.   Many of the elements and arguments in the United States statement 
are incorrect and not valid.  Several are based on alleged concerns that have no basis in the 
actual composite Protocol text.  It was evident that the United States was indeed making a 
"stunning" mistake2 and was failing to take all possible steps to strengthen the international 
norm totally prohibiting biological weapons and to obstruct the proliferation of biological 
weapons.  The evaluation concluded by urging the United States to urgently reconsider its 
position.  
 
4.  Consequently, when following the anthrax attacks in the United States in September and 
October 2001, there was on 1 November 2001 a United States Presidential statement  
addressing the strengthening of the Convention, this was welcomed as it demonstrated a US 
intention to re-engage in the multilateral activities to ensure the prevention of biological 
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weapons.  The Presidential statement3 said that "The United States is committed to 
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as part of a comprehensive 
strategy for combating the complex threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism." 
and went on to propose that '...all Parties: 
 
• Enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited BW activities with 
strong extradition requirements; 
 
• Establish an effective United Nations procedure for investigating suspicious 
outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use; 
 
• Establish procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns; 
 
• Commit to improving international disease control and to enhance mechanisms for 
sending expert response teams to cope with outbreaks; 
 
• Establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic 
engineering of pathogenic organisms; 
 
• Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of ethical conduct 
that would have universal recognition; and 
 
• Promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and shipment of 
pathogenic organisms. 
 
The statement continues to say that "Our objective is to fashion an effective international 
approach to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.  The ideas we propose do not 
constitute a complete solution to the use of pathogens and biotechnology for evil purposes.  
However, if we can strengthen the Convention against the threat of biological weapons, we 
will contribute to the security of the people of the United States and mankind as a whole." 
 
5.  In our briefing book4 for the Fifth Review Conference, we emphasized that the fact that 
the United States had recently made proposals was to be welcomed and that it was clear from 
the Presidential statement that the United States was expecting to engage in dialogue about 
these proposals as the statement said that "I have directed my Administration to consult with 
our friends and allies, as well as with Congress, industry, and non-governmental experts, on 
these proposals.  We look forward to hearing the new ideas on how best to achieve our 
common aim of eliminating biological weapons.".  We underlined the importance of the Fifth 
Review Conference recognizing the continuing need to strengthen the BTWC and the need to 
explore all proposals for achieving this.   Such proposals would need to be explored in an 
appropriate multilateral forum which might be a continuation of the Ad Hoc Group.  The key 
requirement is to continue to work urgently on the strengthening of the Convention through a 
legally binding instrument. 
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6.  This then was the background to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention which opened on Monday 19 November 2001 with statements by many 
of the participating States Parties.   Most of these referred to the anthrax attacks in the United 
States, expressed regret at the failure of the Ad Hoc Group to complete the negotiation of a 
Protocol and indicated the importance of continuing to work multilaterally on the 
strengthening of the effectiveness and implementation of the Convention.  The statement5 on 
Monday 19 November 2001 by Belgium on behalf of the European Union  -- and the Central 
and Eastern European countries associated with the EU and the associated countries Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey -- totalling some 27 countries, was representative of that of many States 
Parties.    
 
7.  The EU statement referred to the terrorist acts which struck the United States on 11 
September, as well as the anthrax attacks and expressed solidarity with the American people 
and the government of the United States.  It then went on to say that the EU "believes that 
disarmament and non-proliferation on a multilateral basis are today more than ever essential 
in order to deny terrorists and terrorist organizations any access to more powerful means to 
implement their abominable activities.  The EU will continue to support fully international 
efforts in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation." 
 
8. The EU stressed that "Combating terrorism that makes use of biological and toxin 
weapons is a duty for all States Parties to the BTWC." and that "The international 
community is entitled to expect that the States taking part in this Conference will spare no 
effort to prevent biological weapons from being used by terrorists."   The statement then 
noted that the EU and its Member States had over the past five years "taken an active part in 
the negotiations on a legally binding Protocol establishing a regime to strengthen 
confidence in the implementation of the Convention." and noted that the Council of the 
European Union had in its conclusions of 11 June 2001 "confirmed its commitment to 
contribute to drawing up a Protocol including the set of concrete measures which the EU's 
Common Position of 17 May 1999 defined as essential for the establishment of an 
instrument which would effectively reinforce the Convention."   The statement went on to 
say that "We deeply regret that during the 24th session of negotiations, the Ad Hoc group 
was not able to conclude an agreement on such an instrument to reinforce the Convention.  
The EU considers it essential that the Ad Hoc Group's mandate -- which had been 
unanimously agreed at the 1994 Special Conference, and which remains fully in force -- be 
successfully implemented." 
 
9.   The EU then said that "The Review Conference must be the opportunity to give a new 
impulse to our work by defining a series of commitments and additional measures that 
States should adopt in order to strengthen the implementation of the Convention in all of its 
provisions:  compliance with the fundamental norm defined in article I, non-proliferation 
and export controls, measures in case of concerns over compliance with the Convention 
(e.g. investigation measures), technical assistance and international cooperation." and 
added that "Some of these measures will need to be detailed further.  This should be the 
subject of our work after this Conference."  The EU statement concluded by saying that "It 
is essential that the Conference agree to a regular follow-up to the work to enable the States 
Parties to strengthen the Convention comprehensively." 
 
                                                 
5Belgium, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties of the BTWC, Statement by Belgium on behalf of the 
EU, 19 November 2001. 
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10.   The EU statement had thus indicated a willingness to consider a series of commitments 
and additional measures to strengthen the Convention and recognized the necessity of 
follow-up meetings to detail such measures further as the three week period of the Review 
Conference is too short for substantive negotiation on the detail of such measures. 
 
The United States Statement 
 
11.  The United States statement6 was made by John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security, on Monday 19 November 2001.  This was a five 
page statement with four sections preceded by an introduction: 
 
a.  Introduction 
b.  Straight Talk About BWC Compliance 
c.  New Approaches to the BW Threat 
d.  U.S. Proposals for Strengthening the BWC 
e.  Review Conference Objectives 
 
This analysis considers each of these sections in turn.  For clarity, particular language from 
the statement that is evaluated is reproduced in bold italics. 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
12.  The introduction noted that President Bush in his recent statement to the United Nations 
General Assembly had warned that the world faced the horrifying prospect of terrorists 
searching for weapons of mass destruction and that they can be expected to use biological 
weapons the moment they are capable of doing so.  The statement went on to say that: 
 
We, the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, must demonstrate an 
unwavering commitment to fighting this undeniable threat. We must overcome 
years of talking past each other, and address the real issues. Will we be courageous, 
unflinching, and timely in our actions to develop effective tools to deal with the 
threat as it exists today, or will we merely defer to slow-moving multilateral 
mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening in the real world? 
 
Widespread agreement could be expected for these words -- apart from the final clause or will 
we merely defer to slow-moving multilateral mechanisms that are oblivious to what is 
happening in the real world?  This final clause indicates an inaccurate perception in 
Washington of the real world as multilateral mechanisms are increasingly the norm in 
international relations -- whether the subject is nuclear safety and safeguards as in the IAEA, 
chemical weapons as in the OPCW, international public, animal or plant health as in the 
WHO, OIE and FAO, the environment as in the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity or the development of regional policies and directives as in the European Union. 
Indeed, whether  multilateral mechanisms are slow-moving or not depends on the readiness 
of governments to work constructively together.  It is simply not true to suggest that such 
multilateral mechanisms are oblivious to what is happening in the real world.    
 
                                                 
6John R. Bolton, Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, United States Department of State to the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, 19 November 2001.  Available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2001/ 1911bolton.htm 
and at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/01111902.htm 
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13.  The statement continues by saying that  
 
The United States has repeatedly made clear why the arms control approaches of 
the past will not resolve our current problems. This is why we rejected the flawed 
mechanisms of the draft Protocol previously under consideration by the Ad Hoc 
Group. Countries that joined the BWC and then ignore their commitments and 
certain non-state actors would never have been hampered by the Protocol. They 
would not have declared their current covert offensive programs or the locations of 
their illegal work -- nor would the draft Protocol have required them to do so. By 
giving proliferators the BWC stamp of approval, the Protocol would have provided 
them with a "safe harbor" while lulling us into a false sense of security.  
 
This assertion in the first sentence implies that past arms control approaches are ineffective -- 
and thus suggests that arms control approaches should no longer be addressed -- but without 
any indication as to what alternative is feasible in the real world.   Certainly the time when the 
superpowers could impose a solution on the rest of the world is long gone -- and the reality is 
that a negotiated multilateral agreement is the only way forward in this day and age.   The 
dismissal in the second sentence of the Protocol reiterates the assertion of 25 July 2001 and is 
again backed by illogical assessments7.   The statement in the third sentence that Countries 
that joined the BWC and then ignore their commitments and certain non-state actors 
would never have been hampered by the Protocol is not an argument against the Protocol 
but rather an argument that underlines the limitations of the Convention and the failure of the 
States Parties in general -- and the Depositaries in particular -- to utilize the mechanisms in 
the Convention and developed at successive Review Conferences to address concerns.  
Indeed, concern about countries ignoring their commitments is one of the compelling 
arguments in support of the Protocol as this would require States Parties to establish National 
Authorities to meet their obligations under the Protocol -- and the mechanisms in the Protocol 
to address ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies and omissions would make it very much 
harder for any State Party to ignore its commitments.   The assertion that non-state actors 
would never have been hampered by the Protocol is also incorrect as the implementation of 
the Protocol would require States Parties to enact penal legislation to make work on 
biological weapons a criminal offence, would require improved implementation of Article III 
of the Convention in respect of transfers, and over time the enhancement of infrastructure 
relating to biosafety and GMP in the States Parties would not only bring benefits for health 
and safety but would also hamper the activities of non-state actors.   The Protocol was never 
being proposed or presented as a universal panacea but simply as an additional tool to help 
the international community tackle the problems associated with a strengthened regime to 
prevent the development, production and acquisition of biological weapons. 
 
14. The fourth sentence They would not have declared their current covert offensive 
programs or the locations of their illegal work -- nor would the draft Protocol have 
required them to do so is a surprising assertion that ignores the reality of the real world.  
Does the United States really believe that any State would enter into an agreement to declare 
their current covert offensive programs?  Certainly, there is no prospect of any Protocol 
containing such a requirement. Such a requirement would have to proceed from the 
assumption that States Parties were ignorant, or contemptuous, of their obligations under 
Articles I and/or II of the Convention.  But the Protocol is intended to strengthen the 
                                                 
7Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The US Rejection of the Composite Protocol: A 
Huge Mistake based on Illogical Assessments, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation 
Paper No 22, August 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Convention -- not to undermine its credibility. Although we have argued8 that there is much 
to be said for declarations in the draft Protocol of the locations of past offensive programmes 
and their locations -- and for a regime that builds confidence that such facilities are only used 
for permitted activities -- such ideas were not fully developed by the negotiators of the draft 
Protocol.   This same charge could be leveled at the BTWC -- but then the United States fully 
supports the Convention even though its compliance mechanisms are limited. 
 
15.  The fifth sentence By giving proliferators the BWC stamp of approval, the Protocol 
would have provided them with a "safe harbor" while lulling us into a false sense of 
security is inaccurate as proliferators, who were States Parties to the Convention, would be 
unlikely to accede to the Protocol as the obligations of the Protocol would increase the chance 
that prohibited activities were exposed -- and, indeed, this is one of the clear benefits from the 
Protocol.  This incorrect assertion is reiterated in different words in the next paragraph when 
the question was asked "Do we really believe that a Protocol that would allow violators to 
conduct an offensive biological weapons program while publicly announcing their 
compliance with the agreement is "better than nothing?""  This assertion completely 
ignores the provisions in the Protocol for mandatory declarations and the follow-up 
procedures for declarations including the clarification of uncertainties, ambiguities, anomalies 
and assertions let alone the provisions for addressing compliance concerns. 
 
16.  The introduction then goes on to say that before we consider new ways to strengthen the 
Biological Weapons Convention we must first confront the failure of many states to abide 
by that very document. Too many states are parties to the BWC but have not lived up to 
their commitments. Whilst a laudable statement, it behoves any State Party making such a 
statement to first examine their own record with regard to the use of the procedures already 
available under the Convention to challenge such States Parties.  Procedures for the 
investigation of complaints of non-compliance have always existed under Article VI, but if 
the United States did not wish to involve the Security Council, it could have used Article V 
instead and have a Formal Consultative Meeting convened, as Cuba did in 19979.  It is to be 
noted that when John Bolton gave a press conference10 in Geneva immediately after making 
his statement to the Review Conference, he was repeatedly asked by a journalist, who noted 
that the BW Convention has certain provisions to clarify the kind of allegations you have 
made at least vis a vis those countries that are also states parties,  the question why hasn't the 
U.S. yet entered this kind of procedures.  Like for instance Cuba did years ago when they had 
some allegations against the U.S.  Are you going to do that?  The journalist received no 
answer as to whether the US would or would not use the procedures elaborated at previous 
Review Conferences under Article V to address compliance concerns. 
 
                                                 
8Graham S. Pearson, The Ad-Hoc Group: Past Biological Weapons Facilities in Erhard Geissler, Lajos Gazsó 
and Ernst Buder (eds),  Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, NATO 
Science Series, 1. Disarmament Technologies, Vol 21.  pp. 201-208.  Graham S. Pearson, Past Biological 
Weapons Facilities: An Opportunity for the Ad Hoc Group, ASA Newsletter 97-6, 4 December 1997, issue 
number 63, p.1, 16-17. 
9See account in Graham S. Pearson, Article V: Consultation and Cooperation in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm 
R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the 
Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
10John R. Bolton, Transcript of Press Briefing by the Honorable John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 19 November 2001.  Available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2001/ 1911boltonpress.htm and at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/011112001.htm 
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17.  It then declares that The United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow 
rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons.  This emphatic assertion is 
again laudable -- but it needs to be borne in mind when considering the proposals put forward 
by the United States later in the statement and used as test of their value.  The introduction 
concludes by again hitting the Protocol by saying that We will continue to reject flawed texts 
like the draft BWC Protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of 
lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the 
United States and many other countries represented here today.  This is a misrepresentation 
of the reality of the situation -- the composite Protocol was recommended as being an 
effective and worthwhile strengthening of the BTWC and was the best that could be 
negotiated at this time.  Many States Parties would have liked to have seen a stronger 
Protocol but the political reality is that the States Parties -- and particularly the United States -
- were not prepared to agree to a stronger Protocol.  It is therefore disingenuous, to say the 
least, of the United States to claim that the composite Protocol was not in the best interests of 
many other countries represented here today as it was evident from the statements in July 
that over 50 of the 55 or so States Parties engaged in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations of the 
Protocol considered that the composite Protocol was in their best interests. 
 
B. Straight Talk About BWC Compliance 
 
18.  This section of the statement starts in the first paragraph by noting that While the vast 
majority of the BWC's parties have conscientiously met their commitments, the United 
States is extremely concerned that some states are engaged in biological weapons activities 
that violate the Convention. and goes on to say that We also are concerned about potential 
use of biological weapons by terrorist groups, and states that support them. So I plan to 
name names. Prior to September 11, some would have avoided this approach. The world 
has changed, however, and so must our business-as-usual approach. These words suggest 
that the approach being adopted of naming names is new.  This is, however, not the case as 
10 years ago at the Third Review Conference two of the Depositary States, the United States 
and the United Kingdom, named names.  The United States stated11 that: 
 
Among the proliferators are states which have thrown aside the international 
obligations and standards they assumed when they signed and in some cases ratified 
the BW Convention.  We must not and cannot turn a blind eye to states not in 
compliance with the object and purpose of the Convention. ... We have a striking 
recent example of the threat posed by noncompliance and the importance of 
addressing the issue head-on.  That example is Iraq, which has clearly had a 
biological weapons program, even though it had signed the Biological Weapons 
Convention. ... We  believe the Soviet Union and other states have extensive biological 
weapons programs in violation of the BW Convention.  We insist that those 
signatories and Parties not in compliance with their obligations "get their house in 
order" and take the steps necessary towards full compliance.  We will strongly urge 
the Conference to express similar sentiments in its final document. 
 
At the same Review Conference, the United Kingdom also named names by stating12 that: 
                                                 
11Ronald F. Lehman II, Statement by Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman II Head of United States Delegation, 
Third Review Conference, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 10 September 1991. 
12Tessa Solesby, Statement by Ambassador Solesby, Leader of the Delegation of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
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Our concern about the compliance of States Parties with the Convention is based on 
real grounds.  We have already referred to ... Iraq .... The United Kingdom also has 
long-standing concerns over the non-compliance of the Soviet Union with the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
 
19. These concerns were reflected in the Article I section of the Final Declaration of the Third 
Review Conference where the Conference "expresses concern at statements by some States 
Parties that compliance with Articles I, II and III has been, in their view, subject to grave 
doubt in certain cases..." 
 
20.  Similarly at the Fourth Review Conference, four States Parties -- Australia, France, and 
two Depositary States, the UK and the US, all named both Iraq and the former Soviet Union 
as being non-compliant in the General Debate.  The UK said13 that "The existence of a 
massive offensive biological weapons programme conducted illegally for years in the Soviet 
Union has recently come to light."  and on Iraq said that "thousands of Coalition troops, as 
well as neighbouring civilian populations, were at real risk from Saddam Hussein’s extensive 
biological weapons programme during the Gulf War."    The United States noted14 that 
“After more than twenty years under that global norm, the threat of biological warfare 
remains all too real. In 1992, for example, President Yeltsin publicly and bravely 
acknowledged and then renounced the massive offensive biological weapons program Russia 
had inherited from the Soviet Union. The challenge to demonstrate full eradication of that 
programme still remains.” In respect of Iraq, the US said “Through UNSCOM and other 
sources, we have learned in disturbing detail about the scope, ambition, and persistence of 
Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons program in Iraq.”     Finally, the US said "Overall, 
the United States believes that twice as many countries now have or are actively pursuing 
offensive biological weapons capabilities as when the Convention went into force."     
 
21.  In 1996, at the Fourth Review Conference, the United States proposed15 the following 
language to the Committee of the Whole that "The Conference emphasizes the vital 
importance of full implementation by all States Parties of all the provisions of the Convention 
and notes its concern that compliance with Article I, by some States Parties, has been subject 
to doubt in certain specific cases.   The Conference notes the efforts of UNSCOM to address 
some of these concerns and expresses its support for the early and satisfactory completion of 
UNSCOM's important work.   The Conference also notes the important decree by the 
President of the Russian Federation in April, 1992, indicating that his country would 
accomplish its obligations under the Convention.   The Conference expressed the hope that 
objectives outlined in that decree would rapidly be fulfilled.   The Conference agrees that the 
application by States Parties of positive approaches in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention is in the interests of all States Parties and that any non-compliance with its 
provisions would undermine confidence in the Convention."  The negotiations leading to the 
Final Declaration were difficult with neither Iraq nor the Russian Federation wishing to see 
                                                                                                                                                       
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 11 
September 1991. 
13David Davis, MP, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, Statement,  
Biological Weapons Convention Fourth Review Conference, 26 November 1996. 
14John D. Holum,  Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Statement,  Biological 
Weapons Convention Fourth Review Conference, 26 November 1996. 
15United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Report of the Committee of the Whole, BWC/CONF.IV/6,  29 November 1996, p.12. 
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any specific mention of their countries even though both countries had since the Third 
Review Conference openly acknowledged having had offensive biological weapons 
programmes.   The eventual language in the Article I section of the Final Declaration stated : 
 
"The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full implementation 
by all States of all the provisions of the Convention, especially Articles I, II and III.   
The Conference agrees that the application by States Parties of positive approaches 
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention is in the interests of all States 
Parties and that any non-compliance with its provisions would undermine confidence 
in the Convention.   Non-compliance should be treated with determination in all 
cases, without selectivity or discrimination." 
 
22.  The US statement to the Fifth Review Conference then continued by naming names in 
the subsequent paragraphs.  The second paragraph addresses the stated intention of Usama 
bin Laden and his al Quaeda terrorist organization and concludes by noting that "While the 
United States is not prepared, at this time, to comment on whether rogue states may have 
assisted a possible al Quaeda biological weapons program, rest assured that the United 
States will not rely alone on treaties or international organizations to deal with such 
terrorist groups or the states that support them." and then goes on to add that "Neither the 
Biological Weapons Convention nor the former draft BWC Protocol would stop biological 
terrorism by groups like al Quaeda or restrain their rogue-state patrons."   This sweeping 
assertion that neither the Convention nor the draft Protocol would stop biological terrorism by 
terrorist groups or restrain their rogue-state patrons does not do justice to the value of the 
norm established by the BTWC that biological weapons are totally prohibited and fails to 
recognize that the ultimate aim of any multilateral treaty is to achieve universality -- and 
thereby to become customary international law.  It also is misleading in that it fails to 
recognise that the obligations of the Convention in Article IV require each State Party to take 
any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery 
specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.   Moreover, the obligations in Article III require 
each State Party not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in 
any way to assist encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international 
organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.   It should also be 
noted that at the Fourth Review Conference, the Final Declaration usefully extended the 
understanding in respect of Article III by declaring that "The Conference affirms that Article 
III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national 
or subnational levels."   
 
23.  Furthermore, the statement is misleading in that it fails to recognise that the Protocol 
would help improve implementation of the Convention -- and thus of the national 
implementation of measures to implement Article IV and Article III of the Convention.  In 
respect of Article IV of the Convention, Article 17 of the composite Protocol text states that 
in particular each State Party shall: 
 
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other 
place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention, including enacting penal 
legislation with respect to such a prohibition; 
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(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under the Convention anywhere under its control; and 
 
(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its 
nationality from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the 
Convention anywhere. 
 
Furthermore, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority which shall 
serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization and with other 
States Parties.  The Protocol provisions will over time provide assurance that other States 
Parties have enacted legislation to implement both the Protocol and the Convention which 
will also bring benefits from strengthened national prohibition thereby contributing to 
countering bioterrorism.   As for Article III of the Convention, it has to be recognized that 
what the composite Protocol text actually states in Article 7 is that:  
 
Each State Party shall ... review and, if necessary, amend or establish any 
legislation, regulatory or administrative provisions to regulate the transfer of 
agents, toxins, equipment and technologies relevant to Article III of the 
Convention...[Emphasis added] 
 
Consequently, the Protocol requirement is to establish legislation, regulatory or 
administrative proposals to regulate the transfer of agents, toxins, equipment and technologies 
-- a far cry from the assertion that an effective tool has to be forfeited.  The United States in 
its rejection of the Protocol appears not to recognize that there are many other States Parties 
to the BTWC who have seriously addressed their implementation of Article III of the 
Convention -- and who see the composite Protocol text as being in their national interests.  
This improved implementation of Article IV and Article III of the Convention coupled with 
the Protocol procedures to address and clarify concerns would indeed help to counter 
biological terrorism by national groups and by rogue States who were party to the Convention 
and the Protocol. 
 
24.  The third paragraph addresses Iraq and the work of UNSCOM and its successor 
UNMOVIC.  The paragraph concludes by stating that The existence of Iraq's program is 
beyond dispute, in complete contravention of the BWC. The BWC Protocol would have 
neither hindered nor stopped it.   The contravention of the BWC leads to the question as to 
what actions under the Convention -- such as Article V and Article VI -- have the States 
Parties taken -- and, more particularly, what action has the United States as one of the three 
Depositary States taken?   The final sentence is misleading as it ignores the question as to 
whether Iraq would have acceded to the Protocol and then ignores all the provisions in the 
Protocol for improving the implementation of the Convention -- notably through mandatory 
declarations, the clarification procedures of uncertainties, anomalies, ambiguities or 
omissions, the compliance concern procedures and investigations -- which would certainly 
have hindered Iraq's program. 
 
25.  The fourth paragraph addresses North Korea and concludes by stating that While we are 
hopeful that Pyongyang will come into compliance with the BWC and end its program, the 
fact remains that the BWC has been ineffective in restraining North Korea. The draft 
BWC Protocol would have done no better.   As noted in the previous paragraph in respect of 
Iraq, the non-compliance with the BWC leads to the question as to what actions under the 
Convention -- such as Article V and Article VI -- have the States Parties taken -- and again as 
to what action has the United States, taken?   The final sentence is again misleading as it 
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ignores the question as to whether North Korea would have acceded to the Protocol and then 
ignores all the provisions in the Protocol for improving the implementation of the Convention 
-- notably through mandatory declarations, the clarification procedures of uncertainties, 
anomalies, ambiguities or omissions, the compliance concern procedures and investigations -- 
which would certainly have hindered North Korea's program. 
 
26.  The fifth paragraph then addresses Iran and Libya,  Syria -- a signatory State -- and Sudan 
-- a non party to the BTWC.  It concludes by stating that The BWC has not succeeded in 
dissuading these states from pursuing BW programs and we believe the draft BWC 
Protocol would have likewise failed to do so.   In respect of the States Parties -- Iran and 
Libya -- and the Signatory State -- the concerns about the pursuit of BW programmes raises 
precisely the same questions as for Iraq and North Korea.  Namely, what actions under the 
Convention -- such as Article V and Article VI -- have the States Parties taken -- and again as 
to what action has the United States, one of the three Depositary States, taken?   As for the 
non-State Party, Sudan, the question arises as to what action to encourage Sudan to become a 
State Party has been taken by the States Parties -- and, more particularly, what action has the 
Depositary State, the United States, taken?  The final clause and we believe the draft BWC 
Protocol would have likewise failed to do so. is again misleading as it ignores the question as 
to whether the States named would have acceded to the Protocol and then ignores all the 
provisions in the Protocol for improving the implementation of the Convention -- notably 
through mandatory declarations, the clarification procedures of uncertainties, anomalies, 
ambiguities or omissions, the compliance concern procedures and investigations -- which 
would certainly have helped to dissuade such States from pursuing BW programmes. 
 
27.  The final paragraph of this section concludes with the reasonable exhortation that The 
United States calls upon all BWC parties and signatories that have not done so to 
immediately terminate their offensive biological weapons programs and comply fully with 
their obligations.  
 
C.  New Approaches to the BW Threat 
 
28.  The first paragraph starts by stating that: 
 
In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, widespread violations of the BWC, 
and the weaknesses of the draft BWC Protocol, which rendered it incapable of 
effectively addressing these serious threats, the United States has crafted alternative 
proposals.  
 
and goes on to say that: 
 
Just as we can no longer rely solely on traditional means to fight a war against 
terrorism, we need to look beyond traditional arms control measures to deal with 
the complex and dangerous threats posed by biological weapons.  
 
This argument would be far more convincing had the United States sought to utilize arms 
control measures to the full.  It is not correct make the assertion that the weaknesses of the 
draft BWC Protocol, which rendered it incapable of effectively addressing these serious 
threats as the draft Protocol would have significantly strengthened the Convention and 
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resulted in an improved regime that was well worth having and which would have reduced 
the danger from biological weapons16. 
 
29.  The statement continues in the same paragraph to emphasise that: 
 
Countering these threats will require a full range of measures -- tightened export 
controls, an intensified non-proliferation dialogue, increased domestic 
preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and counter-bioterrorism 
capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks. 
 
before adding, apparently almost as an afterthought the sentence that  Strict compliance by 
all Parties with the BWC is also critical.  The second and final paragraph of this section then 
states that the United States has a dedicated bio-defense program to ensure that Americans 
and our friends and allies are protected against bioweapons attacks.  which is followed by 
even greater emphasis US bio-defense programs are a means to an end, to protect 
Americans and our friends and allies.  This section is concluded by stating that: 
 
An essential element in our strategy is to find agreement in this body on measures 
that countries can undertake immediately to strengthen the BWC. We strongly 
believe that the key is to broaden our understanding of the biological weapons 
threat and the types of measures that are potentially valuable in countering it.  
 
This makes it evident that the US was looking to the Fifth Review Conference to agree 
measures that countries can undertake immediately to strengthen the BWC.  One would 
expect that, in these circumstances -- given the emphasis on measures to be undertaken  
immediately, the United States would have submitted fully elaborated and detailed proposals 
to the Review Conference -- comparable, for example, for the elaborated and detailed 
proposals17 made by South Africa for strengthening of the confidence-building measures.  In 
fact, the US proposals are not elaborated in detail either in the statement or in the proposals 
put to the Committee of the Whole. 
 
30. The final sentence that the key is to broaden our understanding of the biological 
weapons threat and the types of measures that are potentially valuable in countering it is 
welcomed as we have for some time emphasised18 the importance of all the elements of the 
web of reassurance in countering biological weapons whether used by "rogue States" or by 
non-State actors.  Such a web will reassure the State and its public that such weapons are 
totally prohibited and, if used, will have minimal effect.  The elements of this web are: 
 
a.   Strong international and national prohibition regime reinforcing the norm that 
biological weapons are totally prohibited 
                                                 
16Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text: An Effective 
Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, Evaluation Paper No 20, April 2001 and also Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. 
Sims, The Composite Protocol Text: An Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper No 21, July 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk 
/acad/sbtwc 
17South Africa, Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures -- Working Paper by South Africa, BWC/ 
CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
18Graham S. Pearson, Why Biological Weapons Present the Greatest Danger, Seventh International Symposium 
on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, Sweden, 15-19 June 2001.  
Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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b.   Broad international and national controls on the handling, storage, use and transfer 
of dangerous pathogens 
c.   Preparedness including both active and passive protective measures and response 
plans that have been exercised 
d.   Determined national and international response to any use or threat of use of 
biological weapons ranging from diplomatic sanctions through to armed intervention, 
 
which together are mutually reinforcing and lead a would-be possessor to judge that 
acquisition and use of BW would not be valuable, would be detected and incur an 
unacceptable penalty.  It is, however, necessary to stress the importance of strengthening the 
international and national prohibition element -- in other words, the arms control regime and 
its national implementation. 
 
D.  U.S. Proposals for Strengthening the BWC 
 
31.  In the next section, the US proposals are described in three subsections: 
 
•  National Implementation (Article IV) 
•  Consultation and Cooperation (Article V) 
•  Assistance to Victims (Article VII) and Technical and Scientific Cooperation 
 (Article X) 
 
Each subsection is considered in turn below using as criteria the requirements elaborated 
earlier in the United States statement, namely, that The United States will simply not enter 
into agreements that allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons. 
and that these are measures that countries can undertake immediately to strengthen the 
BWC.  
 
32.  National Implementation (Article IV).  A number of specific proposals are made in this 
subsection: 
 
(a)  The United States proposes that Parties agree to enact national criminal 
legislation to enhance their bilateral extradition agreements with respect to BW 
offenses and to make it a criminal offense for any person to engage in activities 
prohibited by the BWC.  
 
(b) Further, Parties should have strict standards for the security of pathogenic 
microorganisms and: (a) adopt and implement strict regulations for access to 
particularly dangerous micro-organisms, including regulations governing domestic 
and international transfers; and (b) report internationally any releases or adverse 
events that could affect other countries. 
 
(c)  Sensitizing scientists to the risks of genetic engineering, and exploring national 
oversight of high-risk experiments, is critical and timely, as is a professional code 
of conduct for scientists working with pathogenic micro-organisms. 
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33.  Enactment of criminal legislation.  This has long been encouraged by the States Parties at 
the Review Conferences -- at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration19 
in the section on Article IV stated that: 
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of States Parties 
in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to 
any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, 
in accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within its 
territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invites 
each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with 
international law, the application of such measures also to actions taken anywhere by 
natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
In addition, the composite Protocol text20 included in Article 17 the requirement for each 
State Party to: 
 
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place 
under its jurisdiction as recognised by international law from undertaking any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention, including enacting penal 
legislation with respect to such a prohibition; 
 
(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any activity prohibited to a 
State Party under the Convention anywhere under its control; and 
 
(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its 
nationality from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State party under the 
Convention anywhere. 
 
Moreover, provision is also made in the Protocol for each State Party to cooperate with other 
States Parties in providing the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the 
implementation of the obligations detailed above. 
 
34.  It is also evident from the experience of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention with its closely similar requirements to those in the composite Protocol, that the 
future Organization would provide valuable surveys of the legislative and administrative 
measures taken by each State Party thereby providing an effective and efficient means by 
which the enactment provisions can be harmonized and strengthened by States Parties. 
 
35.  The US proposal to the Fifth Review Conference regarding the enactment of criminal 
legislation is welcomed.  It does not, however, meet the criteria of not allowing rogue states 
or others to develop and deploy biological weapons.  Although, in principle, it could be 
undertaken immediately to strengthen the BWC, this, in the real world, is unlikely as the 
record over the past decade when Review Conferences have exhorted the States Parties to 
enact necessary measures and to provide information on the texts of specific legislation 
                                                 
19United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
20United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/56-1 and 56-2, 18 May 2001, Geneva, Annex B. 
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enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention to the 
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs has been poor.   
 
36.  Strict standards for the security of pathogenic microorganisms.  This has also long been 
encouraged by the States Parties at the Review Conferences -- at the Fourth Review 
Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration21 in the section on Article IV stated that the 
Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological agents, 
or toxins;  
 
The Fourth Review Conference, reflecting the concern amongst States Parties about the 
possible use of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity, also included in 
its Final Declaration language in the sections on the various Articles which implicitly 
required strict standards for the control and security of biological and toxin agents.  Examples 
are the following: 
 
a.  On Article III, the following was included:  The Conference affirms that Article III 
is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, 
national or subnational levels. 
 
b.  Also, on Article III was included: In the development of implementation of Article 
III, the Conference notes that States Parties should also consider ways and means to 
ensure that individuals or subnational groups are effectively prevented from 
acquiring, through transfers, biological agents and toxins for other than peaceful 
purposes. 
 
c.  On Article IV, the following was included The States Parties recognize the need to 
ensure, through the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective 
fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use 
of biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity.  
 
37. The composite Protocol text has also addressed the security of pathogenic 
microorganisms.  In Article 15 Confidence-Building Measures, provision was included for 
the following: 
 
B.  National Legislation and Regulation 
 
Each State Party may at its own discretion provide a list of the number, dates and 
titles of legislation, regulation, directives, orders or other administrative and legal 
measures that govern, regulate, provide guidance on or otherwise control: 
 
(a) Access to buildings or other structures in which pathogens or toxins are 
being produced, handled or stored; 
 
                                                 
21United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
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This provision had been developed from a requirement, that was still within square brackets, 
in the rolling text for a Notification as follows: 
 
[(M) NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 
 
22.  Each State Party [shall at the request of the Organization within [10] days] [may 
on a voluntary basis] declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 3 above, a list of 
the number, dates and titles of legislation, regulation, directives, orders or other 
administrative and legal measures that govern, regulate, provide guidance on or 
otherwise control: 
 
(a) Access to buildings or other structures in which pathogens or toxins are 
being produced, handled or stored; 
 
38.  In addition, the composite Protocol text in Article 14 Scientific and Technological 
Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation includes provisions in several 
places addressing biosafety: 
 
a.  In paragraph 4, each State Party shall promote and support the following activities 
... (a) The publication, exchange and dissemination of information ... on current and 
recent developments ... on biosafety... 
 
b.  In paragraph 23, provision is made for the visiting team, if specifically requested, 
to provide information and advice on: 
 
(a) Biosafety, including environmental protection and occupational health 
issues;... 
 
(g) The provision of information, or guidance, or the identification of any 
specific training opportunities for facility personnel on efficient biosafety, 
occupational health and safety practices and environmental protection 
relevant to the facility.... 
 
c. In paragraph 29 on cooperative relationships with other international organisations 
and among States Parties, provision is made for the Organization to conclude, where 
appropriate, agreements and arrangements in order to, inter alia,: 
 
(a) Derive the greatest possible synergy in, and benefits from: 
 
(iii) Current Good Manufacturing Practice, Good Laboratory 
Practice, biological containment and other biosafety regulations and 
practices. 
 
(vi) Regulations governing the handling, transportation, use and 
release of microbial and other biological agents and toxins. 
 
39.  The US proposal to the Fifth Review Conference regarding strict standards for the 
security of pathogenic microorganisms is welcomed.  It does not, however, meet the criteria 
regarding rogue states and others set out in the US statement..  Although, in principle, it could 
be undertaken immediately to strengthen the BWC, this, in the real world, is unlikely as the 
record over the past decade when Review Conferences have exhorted the States Parties to 
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enact necessary measures and to provide information on the texts of specific legislation 
enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention to the 
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs has been poor.  
 
40.  Sensitizing scientists to the risks of genetic engineering, exploring national oversight of 
high-risk experiments, and a professional code of conduct for scientists working with 
pathogenic micro-organisms.   This is essentially an elaboration of the appeals that have long 
been made by the States Parties at the Review Conference -- at the Fourth Review Conference 
in 1996, the Final Declaration22 in the section on Article I stated that: 
 
8. The Conference appeals through the States Parties to their scientific communities 
to lend their support only to activities that have justification for prophylactic, 
protective and other peaceful purposes, and refrain from undertaking or supporting 
activities which are in breach of the obligations deriving from provisions of the 
Convention. 
 
In addition, an awareness of the prohibitions resulting from the BTWC has also long been 
encouraged by the States Parties at the Review Conferences -- at the Fourth Review 
Conference in 1996, the Final Declaration23 in the section on Article IV stated that the 
Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education programmes 
of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions contained in the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925; 
 
41. The sensitizing of scientists, national oversight of high-risk experiments and a 
professional code of conduct are all embraced under broader provisions in the composite 
Protocol text which has included in Article 14 Scientific and Technological Exchange for 
Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation, as well as the provisions outlined in the 
previous section addressing biosafety, the following provisions:   
 
a.  In paragraph 23, provision is made for the visiting team, if specifically requested, 
to provide information and advice on: 
 
(d) The principles and requirements of national and international regulatory 
mechanisms governing the production, validation and marketing and sale of 
biological products for prophylaxis, diagnosis and treatment of diseases 
caused by microbial or other biological agents or toxins, in particular 
infectious diseases, and pharmaceutical products and vaccines; 
 
(i) The provision of information and guidance as well as the identification of 
any specific training opportunities for facility personnel to facilitate the 
development, evaluation or licensing of products; 
 
                                                 
22United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
23United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva, 1996. 
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b. In paragraph 29 on cooperative relationships with other international organisations 
and among States Parties, provision is made for the Organization to conclude, where 
appropriate, agreements and arrangements in order to, inter alia,: 
 
(a) Derive the greatest possible synergy in, and benefits from: 
 
(ii) Sharing information on environmental release of genetically-
modified organisms. 
 
(c) Promote and support the establishment of a framework for multilateral co-
operation among the States Parties ... with the aim of inter alia: 
 
(ii) Improving knowledge of relevant existing national regulatory and 
administrative procedures and facilitating harmonisation of such 
procedures. 
 
(d) Facilitate the provision of information and advice about relevant existing 
regulatory procedures on the peaceful uses of microbial and other biological 
agents and toxins. 
 
42.  It should also be noted that in the negotiation of the Protocol, the States Parties were 
careful not to include provisions which overlapped with responsibilities being undertaken by 
other multilateral treaties -- notably the Convention on Biological Diversity which has, for 
example. particular provisions relating to the assessment of hazard in genetic manipulation.   
Quite rightly, the States Parties negotiating the Protocol have sought to focus on those 
activities that are of particular relevance to the BTWC and which the future Organization to 
implement the Protocol would be best fitted to do.  It should be recalled that Article I General 
Provisions of the Protocol specifically states that: 
 
6. In implementing the provisions of this Protocol, the States Parties and the 
Director-General shall, when appropriate, take into account existing agreements and 
competencies of other relevant international organizations and agencies as well as 
the activities of States Parties in order to avoid duplication and to ensure an effective 
and co-ordinated use of resources. 
 
43.  The US proposal to the Fifth Review Conference regarding sensitizing scientists to the 
risks of genetic engineering, exploring national oversight of high-risk experiments, and a 
professional code of conduct for scientists working with pathogenic micro-organisms are 
welcomed.  These do not, however, meet the criteria regarding rogue states or others set out 
in the US statement.  Moreover, care needs to be taken that these proposals do not clash with 
similar closely-related proposals already being developed in other fora, notably by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
44.  Analysis.  The Bolton statement concludes this element by asserting that: 
 
Such measures, if adopted and implemented, will contribute significantly to doing 
what none of the measures in the draft BWC Protocol would do: control access to 
dangerous pathogens, deter their misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert 
states to their risks. Individually and collectively, they would establish powerful new 
tools to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability to prevent the development, 
production or acquisition of dangerous pathogens for illegal purposes. These 
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benefits can be achieved quickly, since implementation does not depend on lengthy 
international negotiation.  
 
This assertion needs to be analysed. Its sweeping assertion that these measures would 
contribute significantly to doing what none of the measures in the draft BWC Protocol 
would do is not accurate.  As has been shown in the sections above, the measures proposed 
by the United States have all largely been included in the Final Declarations of previous 
Review Conferences and had been incorporated into the composite Protocol text.  The 
principal problem with these United States proposals is that none of them would meet the 
criteria laid down by John Bolton -- The United States will simply not enter into agreements 
that allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons.   Furthermore, 
whilst there is indeed merit in the United States proposals, there is no indication as to how 
they could achieve collectively the declared objective that Individually and collectively, they 
would establish powerful new tools to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability to 
prevent the development, production or acquisition of dangerous pathogens for illegal 
purposes.  It is all too clear that previous measures endorsed by Review Conferences -- 
notably the agreed Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) -- have been interpreted and 
implemented on an individual basis by those States Parties who have decided to submit the 
agreed information -- and this has involved far less than even half of all the States Parties.  
The CBM experience does not provide any basis for the assertion that collectively the United 
States proposals would strengthen the Convention.  There is indeed a compelling need24 for 
an organization to fill the institutional deficit of the BTWC not for its own sake, but to enable 
the treaty regime to evolve more coherently over the periods in between Review Conferences;  
and, more concretely, to enable the States Parties collectively to carry out the actions to which 
they are committing themselves, politically, in the Final Declarations of the Review 
Conferences.  The organization to implement the Protocol would have been particularly 
effective in strengthening the BTWC regime. 
 
45.  Consultation and Cooperation (Article V).   Two further proposals are made in this 
subsection: 
 
a.  The United States seeks to establish a mechanism for international 
investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents.  
 
b.  We are also supportive of setting up a voluntary cooperative mechanism for 
clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent, to include 
exchanges of information, voluntary visits, or other procedures to clarify and 
resolve doubts about compliance.  
 
46.  A mechanism for international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or 
alleged BW incidents.   The United States statement makes it clear that the proposed 
mechanism would require Parties to accept international inspectors upon determination by the 
UN Secretary General that an inspection should take place. The statement asserts that this 
would make investigations of such events more certain and timely and goes on to argue that it 
would also allow us to acquire internationally what is likely to be the first hard evidence of 
                                                 
24See Nicholas A. Sims, The Functions of the BTWC Review Conferences: Maximizing the Benefits from the 
Fifth Review Conference, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conference Paper No. 2, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
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either accidental or deliberate use of biological warfare agents and help insure that any such 
event did not get covered up by the responsible parties.  
 
47.  In considering this proposal, it is important to recognise that the BTWC provides for 
such an investigation as Article VI states that: 
 
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting 
in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a 
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should 
include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its 
consideration by the Security Council.  
 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any 
investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received 
by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention 
of the results of the investigation.  
 
48.  In addition, successive Review Conferences have addressed the importance of prompt 
investigations with language such as that in the Article VI section of the Final Declaration of 
the Fourth Review Conference which states that: 
 
4. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council 
resolution 620 (1988), which at the time encouraged the United Nations Secretary-
General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to its 
attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that could entail a violation of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol or of any other applicable rule of international treaty or customary 
law. The Conference also recalls the technical guidelines and procedures contained 
in Annex I of United Nations document A/44/561 to guide the United Nations 
Secretary-General on the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible 
use of such weapons. The States Parties reaffirm their agreement to consult, at the 
request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the 
United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations. The 
Conference stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called upon 
to take appropriate measures expeditiously, which could include a request to the 
Security Council to consider action in accordance with the Charter. 
 
49.  The composite Protocol text included in Article 9 and Annex B detailed and well-
developed procedures for the carrying out of the following types of investigations: 
 
(a) Investigations to be conducted in geographic areas where the release of, or 
exposure of humans, animals or plants to, microbial or other biological agents and/or 
toxins has given rise to a concern about a possible non-compliance with Article I of 
the Convention or use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons... 
 
(b) Investigations of alleged breaches of obligations under Article I of the 
Convention, to be conducted inside the perimeter around a particular facility at which 
there is a substantive basis for a concern that it is involved in activities prohibited by 
Article I of the Convention...  
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50.  Against this background, the question needs to be asked as to what does the United States 
proposal add?  The proposal is not detailed and can, therefore, only be compared to the 
provisions already in the Convention in Article VI which have been the subject of the 
extended understandings contained in the Final Declarations of previous Review 
Conferences.  The United States proposal does not address the principal shortcoming of the 
existing provisions relating to investigations mounted by the United Nations Secretary-
General -- namely that they can only take place within a State which has invited the 
Secretary-General to mount such an investigation within its territory. 
 
51.  In comparison with the provisions in the composite Protocol text, the United States 
proposal falls far short as it is limited to investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks 
and/or alleged BW incidents -- it does not address accidental releases nor any compliance 
concerns related to facilities.  Nor does the proposal meet the requirement specified earlier in 
the United States statement of not entering into agreements that allow rogue states or others 
to develop and deploy biological weapons. 
 
52.  A voluntary cooperative mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by 
mutual consent, to include exchanges of information, voluntary visits, or other procedures to 
clarify and resolve doubts about compliance.   In considering this proposal, it is important to 
recognise that the BTWC provides for consultation and cooperation  as Article V states that: 
 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to 
cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or 
in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.   Consultation and 
Cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in 
accordance with its Charter.  
 
53.  Furthermore, successive Review Conferences have developed procedures to strengthen 
the implementation of the provisions of Article V.  These were adopted in the Article V 
section of the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference and had built on the 
agreements reached at the First and Second Review Conferences.   These procedures are 
elaborated as follows in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference which stated 
that: 
 
The Conference reaffirms the agreement reached at the Second Review Conference, 
and agrees that in order to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article 
V the following procedures should be adopted: 
 
- A formal consultative meeting could be preceded by bilateral or other 
consultations by agreement among those States Parties involved in the 
problems which had arisen; 
 
- Requests for the convening of a consultative meeting shall be addressed to 
the Depositaries, who shall immediately inform all States Parties of the 
request and shall convene within 30 days an informal meeting of interested 
States Parties to discuss the arrangements for the formal consultative meeting, 
which shall be held within 60 days of receipt of the request. 
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- With regard to taking decisions, the consultative meeting shall proceed in 
accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Rule Conference; 
 
- The costs of the consultative meeting shall be met by the States parties 
participating in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale 
prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations 
membership and the number of States Parties participating in the meeting; 
 
- A consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in 
relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the 
Convention, suggest ways and means for further clarifying, inter alia, with 
assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or 
unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the 
framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter; 
 
- The consultative meeting, or any State Party, may request specialized 
assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective 
of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, through, inter 
alia, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations and in accordance with its Charter; 
 
- The States Parties agree that, should the consultative meeting, or any State 
Party, make use of such procedures within the framework of the United 
Nations, including lodging a complaint with the Security Council under 
Article VI of the Convention, the Secretary-General may be kept informed; 
 
- The Conference considers that States Parties shall cooperate with the 
consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in 
relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention, and in clarifying ambiguities and unresolved matters, as well as 
cooperate with appropriate international procedures within the framework of 
the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter; 
 
54.  It should also be noted that these procedures were utilised25 in 1997 by Cuba concerning 
an outbreak of Thrips palmi in Cuba. A formal consultative meeting, attended by 74 States 
Parties, was held in Geneva on 25 - 27 August 1997 and led to a Chairman's report issued on 
15 December 1997 by Ambassador Ian Soutar of the UK which outlined the process which 
had been followed.  The report concluded that "due inter alia to the technical complexity of 
the subject and the passage of time, it has not proved possible to reach a definitive 
conclusion with regard to the concerns raised by the Government of Cuba."  The report went 
on to emphasise that "there had been general agreement throughout the process that the 
requirements of Article V of the Convention and of the consultative process established by the 
Third Review Conference have been fulfilled in an impartial and transparent manner."    
Furthermore, "the Bureau agreed that the experience of conducting this process and 
consultation had shown the importance of establishing as soon as possible an effective 
Protocol to strengthen the Convention which is being negotiated in the Ad Hoc Group." 
                                                 
25See account in Graham S. Pearson, Article V: Consultation and Cooperation in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm 
R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the 
Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, November 2001.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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55.  The composite Protocol text in Article 8 Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation 
elaborates in some detail the procedures to be followed on any matters which may be raised 
relating to the objects and purpose of the Convention.  Furthermore, Article 6 Follow-Up 
after Submission of Declarations includes procedures to resolve any ambiguities, 
uncertainties, anomalies or omissions in declarations which include written consultation, 
consultative meetings and visits. 
 
56.  Against this background, the question needs to be asked as to what does the United States 
proposal for a voluntary cooperative mechanisms add?   The States Parties to the Convention 
have already elaborated -- and utilised -- a procedure for solving any problems which may 
arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.  
In addition, in accordance with the obligation under Article V of the Convention,  successive 
Review Conferences in their Final Declarations under Article V have clearly recognized that, 
as at the Fourth Review Conference: 
 
 1. The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation 
assumed by States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any 
problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the 
provisions of, the Convention.  
 
This reemphasizes that States Parties have an obligation to consult and cooperate with one 
another in solving any problems. 
 
57.  The United States proposal for a voluntary cooperative mechanism falls far short of the 
provisions in the composite Protocol text.  And again the proposal does not meet the 
requirement specified earlier in the United States statement regarding not entering into 
agreements that allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons. 
 
58.  Assistance to Victims (Article VII) and Technical and Scientific Cooperation (Article 
X).   Three further proposals are made in this subsection: 
 
a.  Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of dangerous 
pathogens, 
 
b.  Strengthening international tools to detect serious illness and/or potential illegal 
use of biology,  
 
c.  Providing assurance of help in the event of a serious disease outbreak. 
 
59.  Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of dangerous pathogens.   The 
United States statement expands on this by adding As we are aware, biosafety standards vary 
widely throughout the world. The United States strongly believes every country would 
benefit from adopting rigorous procedures, and therefore proposes that Parties adopt and 
implement strict biosafety procedures, based on WHO or equivalent national guidelines.  It 
is unclear from the statement precisely how this proposal differs from that for strict 
regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms made under National 
Implementation (Article IV).   The analysis provided above of the latter proposal shows how 
previous Review Conferences and the composite Protocol text have previously addressed this 
point.    
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60.  However, as noted earlier, care needs to be taken that proposals do not clash with similar 
closely-related proposals already being developed in other fora, notably by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity26 and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.   The Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in its Article 19 "Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of 
its Benefits" in its third and fourth paragraphs addresses safety and transfer aspects: 
 
"3.   The Parties shall consider the need for and the modalities of a protocol setting 
out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, 
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism 
resulting from biotechnology which may have adverse effect on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity." 
 
"4.   Each Contracting Party shall, directly or by requiring any natural or legal 
person under its jurisdiction providing the organisms referred to in paragraph 3 
above, provide any available information about the use and safety regulations 
required by that Contracting Party in handling such organisms, as well as available 
information on the potential adverse impact of the specific organisms concerned to 
the Contracting party into which those organisms are to be introduced." [Emphasis 
added] 
 
61.  The first Conference of the Parties to the CBD was held in Nassau, Bahamas from 28 
November to 9 December 1994.   It established an Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
Biosafety with a mandate 
 
"(a) to consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate 
procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of safe 
transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from 
biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable 
user of biological diversity; and 
 
(b) to consider existing knowledge, experience and legislation in the field of biosafety, 
including the views of Parties, subregional, regional and international organizations, 
with a view to presenting a report for consideration at the second meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties, so as to enable the Conference of the Parties to reach an 
informed decision as to the need for and the modalities of a protocol." 
 
62. A review was then carried out of existing international and regional 
guidelines/agreements on biosafety and identified needs for additional action in several areas 
such as the need for immediate action by countries which have not adopted specific 
regulations for biosafety or have not used existing legislation to promulgate regulations for 
biosafety.   Furthermore, whilst some efforts at regional harmonization have been undertaken 
or are underway, such regional harmonization was not occurring on a global basis and the 
panel felt that such action should be initiated in those regions where it has not yet begun.  
Several main conclusions were drawn which included the following: 
 
"The Panel strongly believes that capacity building is essential to ensure adequate 
capacities to implement effectively biosafety regulations at the national level in a way 
which also promotes safe development in the field of biotechnology." 
                                                 
26See account by Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 6, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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and 
 
"The Panel also strongly believes that immediate action is needed to access existing 
biosafety frameworks including their ability to address the movement of LMOs [living 
modified organisms] across national boundaries and to address other related 
transboundary issues.   The Panel finds that such issues are best addressed by an 
appropriate international framework." 
 
63.  A report27 was considered by the second Conference28 of the Parties to the CBD when 
they met in Jakarta on 6 to 17 November 1995 which agreed Decision II/5 stating that the 
Conference of the Parties 
 
"1.   Decides to seek solution to the above mentioned concerns [about safety in 
biotechnology] through a negotiation process to develop in the field of safe transfer, 
handling and use of living modified organisms, a protocol on biosafety, specifically 
focussing on transboundary movement, of any living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, setting out for consideration, in particular, 
appropriate procedure for advance informed agreement; 
 
2.  Decides to establish an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group under the Conference 
of parties which shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference in the annex 
to this decision;"  
 
This decision also stressed the importance of the urgent finalisation of the United Nations 
Environmental Programme International Technical Guidelines on Safety on Biotechnology 
noting that "guidelines on biosafety...may be used as an interim mechanism during the 
development of the protocol and to complement it after its completion, for the purposes of 
facilitating the development of national capacities to assess and manage risks, establish 
adequate information systems and develop expert human resources in biotechnology." 
 
64. At the third meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina on 4 - 15 November 1996, decision III/2029 affirmed its "support for a two track 
approach through which the promotion of the application of the UNEP Technical Guidelines 
for Safety in Biotechnology can contribute to the development and implementation of a 
protocol on biosafety, without prejudicing the development and conclusion of such a 
protocol". 
 
65.  UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology.  A joint initiative 
taken by the UK and the Netherlands following the Rio summit in June 1992 was to develop 
guidelines on safety in biotechnology.    These guidelines were then taken forward by UNEP 
and developed into their International Guidelines.    These are the second approach endorsed 
                                                 
27Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Biosafety, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/2/7, 3 August 1995. 
28Convention on Biological Diversity,  Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Jakarta, 6 - 17 November 1995, UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19 dated 30 November 
1995. 
29Convention on Biological Diversity,  Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 4 - 15 November 1996, UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38 
dated 11 February 1997. 
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by the Committee of Parties to the CBD in parallel with the Biosafety Protocol; namely for 
the finalisation and application of the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in 
Biotechnology.   This was promoted by the decision 18/36 on Biosafety made by the 
Governing Council of UNEP on 26 May 199530 which affirmed the "desirability of the 
United Nations Environment Programme contributing to international efforts on biosafety 
while avoiding duplication with other international activities currently being undertaken by 
other organizations...."    The International Guidelines were adopted by a meeting of the 
Global Consultation of Government-designated Experts held in Cairo, Egypt from 11 to 14 
December 1995 and issued by UNEP31.    The foreword to the International Guidelines by 
Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Executive Director of UNEP, emphasises the linkage between the 
application of the Guidelines and the capacity-building that is essential for their 
implementation as being both obvious and inevitable.   It goes on to say that: 
 
"Indeed, it is vital and urgent for countries and regions to acquire the various 
relevant capacities to implement the Guidelines.   Neither these Guidelines or the 
biosafety protocol currently under development will in or of themselves ensure safety 
in biotechnology development, research and application.   Consequently, the national 
and regional capacity-building programmes that are necessary for the effective 
implementation of these Guidelines should be formulated and given adequate 
technical and financial support on a priority basis.   Founded on sound scientific 
principles, their implementation needs to be undertaken with technical competence, 
logical consistency and judicious urgency." 
 
" UNEP has formulated such a programme as part of its  1996-1997 programme of 
work.   It incorporates components and proposals for funding by, among others, the 
Global Environment facility (GEF), through which developing countries and 
countries with economies in transitions will receive the technical and financial 
support to develop and/or strengthen their national biosafety frameworks which will 
permit the effective implementation of these Guidelines and any future international 
agreement on biosafety within a harmonized regional and global context." 
 
66.  The Foreword goes on to outline essential elements of the role of the national biosafety 
frameworks: 
 
"The development of the national biosafety frameworks called for in the Guidelines 
will entail technical and financial support to Governments and relevant in-country or 
regional entities.  Such support is essential in order to: 
 
* Establish or strengthen national authorities or national institutional biosafety 
mechanisms; 
 
*  Review national legislative, administrative and policy measures on biosafety;.... 
 
* Enhance public awareness of biotechnology risks... through initiatives involving the 
community at large, policy makers, legislators, administrators, the private sector and 
the biotechnology industry;" 
                                                 
30United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Eighteenth Session, 
Nairobi, 15 - 26 May 1995, UNEP/GC. 18/40, 13 June 1995. 
31United Nations Environment Programme,  UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in 
Biotechnology, UNEP Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
 
27 
 
67.  The Preface to the guidelines makes it clear that they have been developed on the basis of 
common elements and principles derived from relevant existing regional and international 
instruments and national regulations and guidelines.  Although it is clear that the Guidelines 
were prepared to focus primarily on living modified organisms, the General Principles and 
Considerations make it clear that the basis for safety in biotechnology rests on the 
characteristics of the basic organisms together with consideration of the newly introduced 
traits.   Annex 3 of the International Guidelines is entitled "Risk Assessment:  Examples of 
Points to Consider, as Appropriate"  which makes it clear that: 
 
The impacts to be considered include those on human health, agricultural production, 
other organisms and the quality of the environment. 
 
It goes on to outline the information required for a scientifically sound risk assessment which 
includes 
 
"INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ORGANISM WITH NOVEL TRAITS 
 
Characteristics of the organism from which the organism with novel traits is derived: 
 
The relevant biological, physiological and genetic and environmental characteristics 
of the recipient/parental/host organism include, as appropriate: 
 
* the name and identity of the organism 
 
* pathogenicity, toxicity and allergenicity (in the case of micro-organisms it 
should be noted that there are internationally accepted classification lists for 
human pathogens.   Similar lists exist at national level for plant and animal 
pathogens);... 
 
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE INTENDED USE 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POTENTIAL RECEIVING ENVIRONMENT" 
 
68.   The Chapter on Mechanisms at National and Regional Level emphasises the importance 
of establishing, designating or strengthening "national and/or regional authorities/national 
institutional mechanisms for oversight and/or control of the use of organisms with novel 
traits."  It notes that "the authority or mechanism should have, or have access to, the relevant 
scientific and technical knowledge and experience."    It says that:  
 
"Effective oversight mechanisms require that: a risk assessment has been done;  or 
the organism has been exempted from oversight on the basis of experience and 
knowledge;  relevant users supply to the authority/national institutional mechanism 
all required relevant information or appropriate references;  users record the 
outcome of relevant activities and inform the authority/national institutional 
mechanism of the outcome when required.   In particular, they should provide 
relevant information if there is an unexpected or adverse effect on human health or 
environmental impact during, or as a result of, the notified use." 
 
It goes on to say that "Mechanisms for oversight and/or control can include prior notification 
to the authority/national institutional mechanism of contained use facilities and certain 
 
 
28 
contained uses and releases of organisms with novel traits."   If such prior notification is 
required, then "such notification may or may not require a positive decision from the 
authority/national institutional mechanism before the notified use can proceed."   The 
Chapter then addresses public participation: 
 
"As set out in Agenda 21 and relevant provisions of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, authorities/national institutional mechanisms are responsible for 
encouraging public participation by allowing access to information on which 
decisions are based, whilst respecting confidential commercial information." 
[Emphasis added] 
 
69.   The Chapter on Mechanisms at International Level focuses on information exchange and 
supply.   It states that "Countries are encouraged to participate in the exchange of general 
information about national biosafety mechanisms...".   It goes on to note that "Countries, 
organizations and companies will wish to be aware of which countries have adopted similar 
measures to those set down in these guidelines to facilitate the exchange of mutually 
acceptable data and assessments.   This form of information exchange can be carried out 
through direct information exchange, as well as through the creation of an international 
register or database."  The chapter then addresses the supply of information related to 
transboundary transfer of organisms with novel traits outlining the information to be provided 
and the concept of the advance informed agreement process. 
 
70.  Analysis.  In Briefing Paper No. 632, the following analysis was provided. It is apparent 
that the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology are being 
widely promoted and are seen as being complementary to the Biosafety Protocol which whilst 
particularly addressing advance informed agreement for transboundary transfers also includes 
Articles on Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Minimum National Standards and on 
Information Sharing/Biosafety Clearing House.   Although all of this is aimed at micro-
organisms with novel traits, the risks are all based primarily on the baseline micro-organism 
and how the novel traits amend the risks.   Internationally, there is a move, certainly for 
micro-organisms with novel traits, towards information exchange and for information supply 
should such micro-organisms be transferred from one country to another.   There is also clear 
encouragement for the provision of information to the public, whilst protecting commercial 
confidential information.    All of this helps to build confidence nationally, regionally and 
internationally that such micro-organisms are being handled, used and transferred in safe 
ways for permitted purposes -- and in this way contributes to building confidence in 
compliance with the BTWC. 
 
71.  Against this background, the question needs to be asked as to what does the United States 
proposal for restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of dangerous 
pathogens, add?  It is far from clear what the proposal adds to what is already being 
undertaken by the States Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.  Nor is it clear 
how duplication will be avoided. Nor does the proposal meet the criteria about agreements 
specified earlier in the United States statement. 
 
72.  Strengthening international tools to detect serious illness and/or potential illegal use of 
biology.    The United States statement also adds that Furthermore, we should enhance 
support of WHO's global disease surveillance and response capabilities.  Previous Review 
                                                 
32Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Some Building Blocks, Briefing Paper No. 6, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, March 1998.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Conferences have in their Final Declarations under Article X addressed this issue.  For 
example, at the Fourth Review Conference, the Final Declaration stated that: 
 
10. The Conference shares the worldwide concern about new, emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases and considers that the international response to them 
offers opportunities for increased cooperation in the context of Article X application 
and of strengthening the Convention. The Conference welcomes the efforts to 
establish a system of global monitoring of disease and encourages States Parties to 
support the World Health Organization, including its relevant newly established 
division, the FAO and the OIE, in these efforts directed at assisting Member States to 
strengthen national and local programmes of surveillance for infectious diseases and 
improve early notification, surveillance, control and response capabilities.  
 
and went on to say that: 
 
12. The Conference urges States Parties, the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies to take further specific measures within their competence for the promotion 
of the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins 
for peaceful purposes and of international cooperation in this field. Such measures 
could include, inter alia:  
 
1. Transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in 
biosciences and greater cooperation in international public health and disease 
control; 
.... 
 
7. Cooperation in providing information on their national epidemiological 
surveillance and data reporting systems, and in providing assistance, on a 
bilateral level and/or in conjunction with WHO, FAO and OIE regarding 
epidemiological and epizootical surveillance, with a view to improvements in 
the identification and timely reporting of significant outbreaks of human and 
animal diseases; 
 
as well as: 
 
16. The Conference welcomes efforts to elaborate an international programme of 
vaccine development for the prevention of diseases which would involve the scientific 
and technical personnel from developing countries that are States Parties to the 
Convention. The Conference recognizes that such a programme will not only enhance 
peaceful international cooperation in biotechnology but also contribute to improving 
health care in developing countries, assist in establishing systems for worldwide 
monitoring of communicable diseases, and provide transparency in accordance with 
the Convention.  
 
73.  The composite Protocol text also addressed this issue in Article 14 Scientific and 
Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Co-operation which includes 
the following provisions  
 
 a.  In paragraph 4 where  
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Each State Party shall promote and support the following activities... 
 
(a) The publication, exchange and dissemination of information ... on current 
and recent developments... on ... diagnosis, surveillance, detection, treatment 
and prevention of diseases caused by microbial or other biological agents and 
toxins, in particular infectious diseases; 
 
(b) The work of existing laboratories on the prevention, surveillance, detection 
and diagnosis of diseases caused by microbial or other biological agents and 
toxins, in particular infectious diseases and to improve the capabilities of such 
laboratories and their effectiveness ... 
 
(c) The improvement and development of the capabilities of States Parties, 
including laboratories, upon the specific request of, and in co-operation with, 
the State Party concerned, in the surveillance, prevention, detection, diagnosis 
and treatment of diseases caused by microbial or other biological agents and 
toxins, in particular infectious diseases as part of a global effort to improve 
the monitoring of emerging and re-emerging diseases in humans, animal and 
plants; 
 
(f) The monitoring, diagnosis detection, prevention and control of outbreaks of 
diseases, ... 
 
b.  In paragraph 23 which provides for a visiting team to provide information and 
advice on: 
 
(c) Diagnostic techniques for infectious diseases... 
 
c.  In paragraph 29 in which the Organization may conclude agreements and 
arrangements to: 
 
(a) Derive the greatest possible synergy in, and benefits from: 
 
(v) The collection and dissemination of information on the diagnosis, 
surveillance, detection, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by 
microbial or other biological agents and toxins, in particular 
infectious diseases; 
 
(b) Co-ordinate its activities with those of international organizations and 
agencies on ... the diagnosis, detection, treatment and prevention of diseases 
caused by such microbial or other biological agents and toxins, in particular 
infectious diseases, and raise awareness of and facilitate access to those 
activities by States Parties to the Protocol; 
 
74.   Against this background, the question needs to be asked as to what does the United 
States proposal for strengthening international tools to detect serious illness and/or potential 
illegal use of biology, add?  It is far from clear what the proposal adds to what is already 
being encouraged under the Final Declarations at the previous Review Conferences.  The 
proposal provides nothing additional to the provisions that had been incorporated into the 
composite Protocol text.  Furthermore, the proposal does not meet the criteria regarding 
agreements specified earlier in the United States statement. 
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75.  Providing assurance of help in the event of a serious disease outbreak.  The statement 
adds that Parties could agree to provide rapid emergency medical and investigative 
assistance, if requested, in the event of a serious outbreak of infectious disease, and to 
indicate in advance what types of assistance they would be prepared to provide. This 
proposal needs to be considered in the light of the provisions in Article VII of the Convention 
that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so 
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger 
as a result of violation of the Convention.  
 
Successive Review Conferences in their Final Declaration have in the Article VII section 
stated that: 
 
3. The Conference takes note of desires expressed that, should a request for 
assistance be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided. 
In this context, pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely 
emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties if requested.  
 
76.  The composite Protocol text has addressed this issue in Article 13 Assistance and 
Protection Against Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons.  This includes the 
following provisions: 
 
a.  In paragraph 4 for the Technical Secretariat to establish ... and maintain ... a 
databank containing freely available information concerning various means of 
protection against bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as well as such 
information as may be provided by States Parties. 
 
b.  In paragraph 6 assurance is provided that nothing in this Protocol shall be 
interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide assistance 
bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties 
concerning the emergency provision of assistance. 
 
c.  In paragraph 7, each State Party undertakes to provide assistance to the extent 
possible through the Organisation and to this end may elect to take one or more of the 
following measures: 
 
(a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the 
Conference at its first session; 
 
(b) To conclude ... agreements with the Organization concerning the 
procurement, upon demand, of assistance; 
 
(c) To declare ... the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an 
appeal by the Organisation.... 
 
d.  In paragraph 8, each State Party has the right to request and ... receive assistance 
and protection against the use or threat of use of bacteriological (biological) and 
toxin weapons if it considers that: 
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(a) Bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons have been used against it; 
 
(b) It is threatened by imminent actions that are prohibited for States parties 
by Article I of the Convention; 
 
(c) It has credible reason to believe it is confronted by imminent actions or 
serious threat with respect to actions that are prohibited for States parties by 
Article I of the Convention.  
 
77.   If the US proposal is intended to be broader than providing assistance in the event of 
attacks involving biological and toxin weapons -- and is intended to address the provision of 
assistance in the event of a serious disease outbreak, then attention needs to be given to the 
provisions incorporated into the constitution of the World Health Organization.  Several are 
relevant: 
 
a.  In Chapter II: Functions, Article 2 states that the functions of the Organization 
shall be: 
 
(d) To furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, necessary 
aid upon the request or acceptance of governments; 
 
b.  In Chapter VI: The Executive Board, Article 28 states that the functions of the 
Board shall include: 
 
(i) To take emergency measures within the functions and financial resources 
of the organization to deal with events requiring immediate action.  In 
particular, it may authorize the Director-General to take the necessary steps 
to combat epidemics, to participate in the organization of health relief to 
victims of a calamity and to undertake studies and research the urgency of 
which has been drawn to the attention of the Board by any Member or by the 
Director-General. 
 
c.  In Chapter XII: Budget and Expenses, Article 58 states that: 
 
 A special fund to be used at the discretion of the Board shall be established to meet 
emergencies and unforeseen contingencies. 
 
78.  In addition, it needs to be noted that the WHO has a Department of Emergency and 
Humanitarian Action (EHA) whose mission33 is described as being: 
 
Through a concerted effort across WHO, to increase the capacity and self-reliance of 
countries in the prevention of disasters, preparation for emergencies, mitigation of 
their health consequences and the creation of a synergy between emergency action 
and sustainable development. 
 
The EHA website at http://who.int/disasters/ includes a number of relevant documents 
addressing topics that include: 
 
                                                 
33World Health Organization, What Does EHA Do?, http://who.int/disasters/mission.cfm 
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a.  WHO: Disaster Preparedness and Response, March 2001 
 
b.  WHO and Emergency Preparedness at Global Level, 13 September 2000 
 
c.  A New Role for WHO in Emergencies, 17 December 1996 
 
These together provide a useful overview of the range of ongoing activities coordinated by 
the WHO for countering health emergencies and epidemics.  It is also clear that within the 
United Nations system, WHO is responsible for coordinating the international response to 
emergencies in the health sector -- and consequently, the WHO maintains relationships with 
UN bodies such as UNICEF and UNHCR. 
 
79.  Against this background, the question needs to be asked as to what does the United States 
proposal for providing assurance of help in the event of a serious disease outbreak, add?  It 
is far from clear what the proposal adds to what is already being encouraged under the Final 
Declarations at the previous Review Conferences -- or, if intended to be wider than assistance 
in the event of attacks involving biological and toxin weapons, then what does it add to what 
is already being coordinated by the WHO?  The proposal provides nothing additional to the 
provisions that had been incorporated into the composite Protocol text.  Furthermore, the 
proposal does not meet the criteria specified earlier in the United States statement. 
 
80.  Analysis.  This section of the Bolton statement then continued with a further paragraph 
stating that: 
 
Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of dangerous 
pathogens, strengthening international tools to detect serious illness and/or 
potential illegal use of biology and providing assurance of help in the event of a 
serious disease outbreak -- these measures all enhance collective security and 
collective well-being -- which is, after all, our ultimate objective. With the exception 
of the final measure, none of these measures was contemplated in the draft BWC 
Protocol. 
 
The recognition that measures to strengthen the implementation of Article X of the 
Convention  all enhance collective security and collective well-being is to be welcomed as 
this has been argued strongly over the past few years.34   However, as shown above, the 
assertion that with the exception of the final measure, none of these measures was 
contemplated in the draft BWC Protocol is not correct. 
 
81.  The statement then concludes this section by saying that: 
 
The United States believes these proposals provide sound and effective ways to 
strengthen the Convention and the overall effort against biological weapons. These 
are measures State Parties can adopt now to make the world safer and proliferation 
more difficult. The choice is ours. 
 
                                                 
34See for example, Graham S. Pearson, Article X:  Specific Measures to Achieve Implementation, Briefing Paper 
No. 9, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, July 1998 and Graham S. Pearson, The 
Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Integrated Regime, Briefing Paper No. 10, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, July 1998 .  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Whilst this is a laudable statement, it is clear that these proposals actually add little if 
anything to what already exists in the Convention, in the Final Declarations of the successive 
Review Conferences and that most if not all were elaborated in the composite Protocol text.  
It is also evident that none of these proposals meet the criteria stated earlier in the Bolton 
statement that The United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue 
states or others to develop and deploy biological weapons. 
 
E. Review Conference Objectives 
 
82.  The final section of the United States statement starts by saying that: 
 
To preserve international unity in our efforts to fight against terrorism and WMD 
proliferation, we need to work together, and avoid procedural or tactical 
divisiveness during the Review Conference that may hinder reaching our mutual 
goal of combating the BW threat.  
 
Whilst there is no doubt at all that this expresses a laudable aim for the Review Conference, it 
is highly regrettable that the United States at the last moment, some two hours prior to the 
end of the Review Conference, proposed language which could not have been more divisive 
to the Review Conference.  Late in the afternoon of the final day, Friday 7 December 2001, 
agreement had been reached on the language in the Final Declaration relating to the first 
eleven Articles of the Convention -- and it was known that consensus language was available 
for Articles XIII, XIV and XV -- when the United States tabled new language, without prior 
consultation with any of the other States Parties,  for Article XII as follows: 
 
"1. The Conference decides, beginning in November 2002, that States Parties will 
meet annually between the Fifth Review Conference and the Sixth Review Conference 
to 
 
(a) consider and assess progress by States Parties in implementing the new 
measures adopted at the Fifth Review Conference; and 
 
(b) consider new measures or mechanisms for effectively strengthening the 
BWC 
 
2.  The Conference decides that an Expert Group may meet, following each annual 
meeting of the States Parties if agreed at the annual meeting.  The Experts group will 
examine matters as directed by the States Parties at the preceding annual meeting.  
The Experts Group will not negotiate measures, but may provide a report, adopted by 
consensus, to the States Parties on matters examined. 
 
3.  The Conference takes note of the work of the Ad Hoc Group, and decides that the 
Ad Hoc Group and its mandate are hereby terminated and replaced with the process 
elaborated in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
4.  The Conference decides that the Sixth Review Conference will be held in 
November 2006." 
 
83.  The third paragraph of this proposal by the United States was received with shock and 
anger not only because of its proposed termination of the Ad Hoc group and its mandate but 
also because of its unexpected introduction less than two hours before the Review Conference 
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was scheduled to end thereby jeopardizing the whole Review Conference and the progress 
towards agreement of a Final Declaration.   In order to avoid complete failure of the Review 
Conference, there was no alternative other than to adjourn the Review Conference until 11 to 
22 November 2002.  Unfortunately, the United States was not living up to its own exhortation 
that we need to work together, and avoid procedural or tactical divisiveness during the 
Review Conference that may hinder reaching our mutual goal of combating the BW threat 
as it was evident that all the other States Parties participating in the Review Conference saw 
the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention as being of continuing relevance and importance. 
 
84.  The United States statement concluded by saying that: 
 
The time for "better than nothing" protocols is over. It is time for us to consider 
serious measures to address the BW threat. It is time to set aside years of diplomatic 
inertia. We will not be protected by a "Maginot treaty" approach to the BW threat. 
The United States asks the states assembled here to join us in forging a new and 
effective approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons. I have laid out 
serious proposals that the United States hopes will form the basis of this new 
approach. I ask that these proposals be endorsed in the Final Declaration. 
 
By working together during this Review Conference, by exchanging ideas and 
proposals that will help us meet this critical challenge, I am confident this 
Convention can succeed in advancing the worldwide effort to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the biological weapons threat.  
 
This once again goes out of its way to criticize the Protocol.  It really is not accurate -- and is 
certainly unfair -- to suggest that the composite Protocol text was in any way a "better than 
nothing" protocol.   Careful analysis35 of what was actually in the composite Protocol text -- 
and not of what was thought to have been in an earlier draft -- shows that the composite 
Protocol text would indeed provide an effective strengthening of the BTWC.  It is also 
evident that the quality of the provisions in the composite Protocol text are worthy to stand 
comparison with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Furthermore, an 
evaluation of the costs and benefits to States Parties of adopting the composite Protocol text 
led to the conclusions36 that: 
 
a.  In signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text, States Parties will be seen to 
have taken all possible practicable multilateral steps to obstruct the proliferation of 
biological weapons. 
 
b.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will reduce the risk of biological 
weapons proliferation and use.  Rejection of the Protocol would send the opposite 
signal and it can be argued that the risk of biological weapons proliferation and use 
will be increased. 
 
                                                 
35Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text: An Effective 
Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, Evaluation Paper No 20, April 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc 
36Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text: An Evaluation of 
the Costs and Benefits to States Parties, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Evaluation Paper 
No 21, July 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc 
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c.  Signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text will bring significant benefits to 
the infrastructure of States Parties in the areas of combatting infectious disease, 
biosafety and good manufacturing practice and thereby benefits in health, safety and 
prosperity for all States Parties, both developing and developed. 
 
d.  Overall, signing and ratifying the composite Protocol text enhances the security of 
all States Parties.  It provides a net gain to collective security.  Rejection of the 
Protocol misses this opportunity and decreases collective security.  
 
In evaluating the composite Protocol text, it has to be remembered that the BTWC with its 
basic prohibitions and obligations has been in force for over 25 years and that the Protocol is 
to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.  It is 
evident from the analysis of the principal costs and benefits on an Article by Article basis of 
the composite Protocol that the Protocol will bring significant and worthwhile benefits to all 
States Parties -- both developed and developing.  A particular benefit from the Protocol arises 
from the establishment of the Organization to implement the Protocol and the benefits that 
this will bring to both the regime and to all States Parties.  Furthermore, a consideration in a 
wider perspective shows that signing and ratifying the composite Protocol will bring a net 
gain for all States Parties.  The Protocol will be effective, over time, in increasing 
transparency and building confidence between States Parties that other States Parties are 
indeed in compliance with the Convention, thereby reinforcing the norm that work on 
biological weapons, whether directed against humans, animals or plants, is totally prohibited.  
The Protocol will bring improved health, safety, security and prosperity to all States Parties. 
 
85.  The suggestion that It is time to set aside years of diplomatic inertia. is actually insulting 
to the States Parties who have worked extremely hard -- and effectively -- over the past 
decade to craft a Protocol that will indeed meet the aim of strengthening the effectiveness and 
improving the implementation of the BTWC.    
 
86.  As for the plea in which The United States asks the states assembled here to join us in 
forging a new and effective approach to combat the scourge of biological weapons., it 
would have been hoped that the United States would have recognised that the lessons from 
the politically-binding measures agreed at previous Review Conferences -- such as the 
Confidence-Building Measures agreed in 1986 and enhanced and extended in 1991 -- is that 
legally-binding measures are the key to effective strengthening by all States Parties rather 
than implementation by the all too few States Parties which have chosen to do so as has been 
shown by the variable and patchy response to the CBMs.     
 
A Further United States Statement 
 
87.  Subsequent to the Review Conference session in Geneva in November/December 2001, 
the United States has made a statement37 to the Conference on Disarmament on 24 January 
2002 which again needlessly goes out of its way to criticize the Protocol.   This statement 
states that: 
 
We flatly oppose flawed diplomatic arrangements that purport to strengthen the BWC 
but actually increase the specter of biological warfare by not effectively confronting 
                                                 
37John R. Bolton, Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, United States Department of State to the Conference on Disarmament, 24 January 2002.  
Available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0124bolton.htm  
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the serious problem of BWC noncompliance.  It is for this reason that the United 
States rejected the draft protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and the 
continuation of the BWC Ad Hoc Group and its mandate, and offered an alternative 
way ahead. 
 
and goes on to say that: 
 
.... After an exhaustive evaluation within the U.S. Government, we decided that the 
protocol was actually counterproductive.  New approaches and new ways of thinking 
are needed to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. 
 
The United States presented a number of new proposals to do just this, including 
tightened national export controls, fully implementing the BWC by nationally 
criminalizing activity that violates it, intensified non-proliferation activities, 
increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and counter-
bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks.  Many, 
if not all of these measures can begin to be implemented now.  We look forward to 
discussing and refining them with all of you and hope that you will join us in 
endorsing and beginning to implement them as we prepare for the resumption of the 
BWC Review Conference next November. 
 
88.  As already noted above, it really is not true to suggest that the composite Protocol text 
would actually increase the specter of biological warfare by not effectively confronting the 
serious problem of BWC noncompliance.   Careful analysis38 of what is in the composite 
Protocol text shows that it would indeed provide an effective strengthening of the BTWC -- 
and would reduce not increase the danger of biological warfare as it would provide an 
effective mechanism to address any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions as 
well as non-compliance concerns -- a far better situation than the present situation in which 
States Parties such as the United States make statements expressing concern about non-
compliance but yet do not utilise the procedures already available to them under the 
Convention to address these concerns and do not work to strengthen the regime effectively 
through a legally binding instrument such as that in the composite Protocol text.  
 
89.  The statement to the Conference on Disarmament says that the United States has 
presented a number of new proposals to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons -- yet 
these proposals, as the above analysis has shown, were not new and were virtually all within 
the composite Protocol text.  There is a curious disconnect between the assertion of the 
United States statement of flat opposition to flawed diplomatic arrangements that purport to 
strengthen the BWC but actually increase the specter of biological warfare by not effectively 
confronting the serious problem of BWC noncompliance yet the new proposals, adopting a 
piecemeal approach, do not address how the United States sees them as actually strengthening 
the BTWC and not increasing the danger of biological warfare. 
 
Conclusions 
 
90.  On the positive side, the proposal by the United States of measures to strengthen the 
BTWC is to be welcomed even though these proposals, on examination, are found to contain 
                                                 
38Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims, The Composite Protocol Text: An Effective 
Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies, Evaluation Paper No 20, April 2001. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk /acad/sbtwc 
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little that is novel as most have long been the subject of language in the Final Declarations at 
previous Review Conferences -- and, more to the point, had been elaborated effectively in the 
composite Protocol text.  Likewise, it is also encouraging that the United States does 
recognize that  this Convention can succeed in advancing the worldwide effort to reduce 
and ultimately eliminate the biological weapons threat.  
 
91.  In contrast, the unfounded and repeated criticism of the Protocol does nothing for the 
credibility of the United States or for its political judgement given the virtually universal 
support for the composite Protocol text.   This is not a situation in which one State, the 
United States, is right and all the other States Parties are wrong -- but rather the reverse.  
There are real collective security benefits to be gained from adoption of the composite 
Protocol text -- and those States Parties that recognise this are making no mistake.  
 
92.  It is especially to be regretted that it became evident during the Review Conference that 
the United States, whilst content to call for national measures, would not consent to any 
language which required multilateral action or sought to arrive at legally binding measures to 
strengthen the regime.  It also apparently had difficulty in accepting language referring to 
other international treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to which the United States is not a Party even though such language 
had been agreed at a previous Review Conference.  The tabling, within two hours of the end 
of the Review Conference, of language, without any prior consultation even with close allies, 
proposing termination of the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate showed a serious misreading of 
the widespread desire of all the other States Parties to strengthen the effectiveness and 
improve the implementation of the Convention in accordance with the mandate of the Ad 
Hoc Group.  The attitude of the United States to the Review Conference and the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention is very hard to understand let alone explain.   
 
93. The rest of the world appreciates and recognizes the value of the multilateral regime 
against biological weapons in strengthening collective security and following the events of 11 
September and the subsequent anthrax attacks in the United States, it would have been 
expected that the United States would have been aware of -- and would have wished to 
benefit from -- the considerable benefits that could accrue from multilaterally strengthening 
the BWC regime as national measures are always going to be subject to national 
interpretation and are unlikely to be harmonised internationally.  The United States has 
missed a real opportunity to help to protect itself -- and its fellow States Parties -- from the 
dangers of biological weapons.  
 
94.  In looking ahead to the resumption of the adjourned Review Conference in November 
2002, there is much to be said for like-minded States -- such as the 36 States Parties on whose 
behalf Brazil had spoken in support of the Chairman's composite text in July 2001 
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and 
Ukraine) together with the other members and associated countries of the European Union 
(such as Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, and United Kingdom) as well as States Parties such as Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, 
Monaco, Singapore, and Switzerland which together would come to over 50 States Parties -- 
to consult together to agree on how to proceed in November 2002 should the United States 
then still not recognise the importance to collective security of a multilaterally strengthened 
BWC regime.   It is also worth remembering that the rules of procedure of the Review 
 
 
39 
Conference do state that "If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve 
consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for 
48 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort ... to facilitate the 
achievement of general agreement."   and then goes on to add that "If by the end of the period 
of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and 
decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, 
providing that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the 
Conference."    
 
95.  Whilst a Final Declaration agreed by consensus is greatly to be desired -- and all our 
efforts should be towards that end -- the satisfactory outcome of the Fifth Review Conference 
is too important for international collective security for this to be jeopardized by the mistakes 
of a single State Party, even if it is also a Depositary.   Today, public and political awareness 
and concern about biological weapons is at an unprecedented level and the world expects all 
the States Parties -- large and small, developed and developing -- at the Review Conference to 
seize this opportunity to make the world a safer place for all of us by agreeing a Final 
Declaration which effectively strengthens the regime against biological weapons. Do not fail 
us. 
 
